departamento de eletrónica,

telecomunicações e informática

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
João Paulo Barraca

## The Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)



Implemented following popular models: Agile, Lean, Waterfall, Iteractive, Spiral, DevOps.....

### The DevOps model



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### **The Problem**

- Software is developed towards a functional objective
  - Considering use cases, requirements and features (in an agile process)
- Security is frequently an afterthought
  - Unless security brings business value, use cases are typically feature oriented

As it is not effective to develop a random software and then add the desired features ... it is not effective to develop a software and then make it secure

### **The Problem**

- Software development is complex
  - Involves several collaborators/teams, several software packages and dependencies
  - Results in multiple artifacts, deployed over a potentially wide ecosystem
  - Easy for development to derail towards wrongly implemented features

As the software becomes more complex, the exposition and opportunities to attackers increase, **becoming hard remove leaked information or to ensure a secure development chain** 

### **The Problem**

- Software increasingly deals with sensitive information
  - Private information from users
  - Confidential information from users or businesses
  - Classified information from governments

## Leaking or manipulation of information can result in high impact incidents for software users. Recovery, if possible, **may be highly expensive**

### **The Problem**


- Software may interact with the real world
  - IoT in homes and offices
  - OT in critical utilities
  - Automata in industries
  - Autonomous agents in business processes and systems (Cars)

### Leaking or manipulation of information can result in high impact incidents for users. Recovery **may be highly expensive and may be impossible**

## Why AppSec

- Software is at the **center** of most activities
- Wide range of threats with more **complex techniques**
- Applications are actively explored for vulnerabilities and **Fraud**
- Impact is broad: brand, financial, reputation, clients
- **Regulatory** and **Legal** ramifications
- Increased demand by clients and requirements to access market


## The Secure DevOps model in practice



People	Processes	Technology
Collaborators Contractors Suppliers Operators Support	Regulatory compliance Development practices Client requirements	Development tools Organization tools Support tools Operational systems Dependencies


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## The **Secure** Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)



## The **Secure** Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)

### **Shift Left:** more effort towards secure requirements and design



## **Overall SDLC Maturity**

### **OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)**

- Effective and measurable way to analyze and improve the secure development lifecycle.
  - SAMM supports the complete software lifecycle and is technology and process agnostic.
  - SAMM is evolutive and risk-driven in nature, as there is no single recipe that works for all organizations.
  - Aligned with NIST CiberSecurity Framework 2.0 (NIST CSF2)
  - Ranges from Organization Strategy to Operations
- Companies can identify their location and build a path towards improving their posture

https://owaspsamm.org/



## **Overall SDLC Maturity**

### **OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)**

	1	Do you have a complete picture of your external compliance obligations?
		You have identified all sources of external compliance obligations
		You have captured and reconciled compliance obligations from all sources
	2	Do you have a standard set of security requirements and verification procedures addressing the organization's external compliance obligations?
Compliance		You map each external compliance obligation to a well-defined set of application requirements
Management		You define verification procedures, including automated tests, to verify compliance with compliance-related requirements
	3	Do you regularly report on adherence to external compliance obligations and use that information to guide efforts to close compliance gaps?
		You have established, well-defined compliance metrics
		You measure and report on applications' compliance metrics regularly
		Stakeholders use the reported compliance status information to identify compliance gaps and prioritize gap remediation efforts

	1	Do you use repeatable deployment processes?
Deployment Process		You have enough information to run the deployment processes
		Your deployment documentation up to date
		Your deployment documentation is accessible to relevant stakeholders
		You ensure that only defined qualified personnel can trigger a deployment
		You harden the tools that are used within the deployment process
	2	Are deployment processes automated and employing security checks?
		Deployment processes are automated on all stages
		Deployment includes automated security testing procedures
		You alert responsible staff to identified vulnerabilities
		You have logs available for your past deployments for a defined period of time
	3	Do you consistently validate the integrity of deployed artifacts?
		You prevent or roll back deployment if you detect an integrity breach
		The verification is done against signatures created during the build time
		If checking of signatures is not possible (e.g. externally build software), you introduce compensating measures

### Legal and Normative Compliance needs

- Specific operational areas have legal requirements
  - Processing of credit card information (a payment processor): PCI-DSS
  - Processing of user data (a shop): GDPR
  - Public sector: DL65/2021 and NIS2
  - Telecommunications: EECC, GDPR, NIS, Digital Services Act
  - Health Data (UK): HIPAA
  - Financial Sector: Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)
  - Others: ISO 27001, ISO 2000, Cyber Resilience Act

- Software planning must consider the legal requirements for the target market
  - Fulfilling legal framework may invalidate software for a given target security posture, functionality and value

### Legal and Normative Compliance needs

- Requirements are focused on product value, but must consider security aspects
  - Security Requirements
    - Multi-layer security protecting Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
  - Avoid fraud and abuse
  - Allow updates and observability


- Requirements must include software and organization wide practices
  - Which tools are use
  - Who supplies them
  - How are system deployed/operated
  - How product support operates

### **Use and Abuse Case**

• Abuse Case: A way to use a feature that was not expected by the implementer, allowing an attacker to influence the feature or outcome of use of the feature based on the attacker action (or input).

- A Business Feature may result in a list of Abuse Cases
  - Each Define:
    - The Abusive Action
    - Source Reference
    - Risk Score (CVSS)
    - Applicable Countermeasure
    - Action to be taken
  - Abuse cases are registered but may be accepted
    - Accepting risk consists in operating with its existence

### **Use and Abuse Case**



### **Use and Abuse Case**

• Feature: Allow user to upload a compressed document along a message

- Abuse-01: Upload Office file with malicious macro in charge of dropping a malware
  - **CVSS**: 6.3
  - Countermeasure: Parse the document for Macros
  - Handling Decision: Risk accepted
- Abuse-02: Upload a Zip Bomb
  - **CVSS**: 9
  - **Countermeasure**: Scan file with a tool before decompression
  - Handling Decision: To be addressed

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### **Security Requirements**


- Specific measures to be met to protect data, resources, and users.
  - Derived from applicable laws, industry standards, and the organization's security policies.
  - Security requirements are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.

- Which security requirements can we set for a service?
  - Will they be **enough**?
  - Will they be **aligned** with current risks?
  - Will they align with the **business requirements** of the application?
  - Will they be aligned with the **quality of competing solutions**?
  - Are they suitable for the **legal/regulatory** environment?
  - Can they be used to **secure the supply chain**?

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### **OWASP Application Security Verification Standard**

- Level 1: The minimum for any application
  - Completely testable from the outside without documentation
  - Partially testable by SAST and DAST applications
  - Considers the most common vulnerabilities and attacks
- Level 2: The right fit for any application
  - Defined for data-sensitive applications
  - Areas such as B2B transactions, Commerce, Gaming
  - Want to protect application from expert attackers
- Level 3: What is needed for critical applications
  - Defined for applications with very sensitive data
  - Areas such as military environments, healthcare, critical infrastructure









### **ASVS**

### V3 Session Management

#### Control Objective

3.1.1	Verify the application never reveals session tokens in URL	√ √ √ 598		<b>References to other</b>
#	Description	L1 L2 L3 CWE	<u>§</u>	Section
V3.1 F	undamental Session Management Security		NIST	
Securi	ity Verification Requirements			
63b con verificat	iously noted, these requirements have been adapted to be a c strols, focused around common threats and commonly exploit tion requirements have been retired, de-duped, or in most case ant of mandatory <u>NIST 800-63b</u> requirements.	ed authentication weak	)- ous th	
• Se	essions are invalidated when no longer required and timed ou	t during periods of inact		
• Se	essions are unique to each individual and cannot be guessed o	or shared.		
Ensure 1	that a verified application satisfies the following high-level ses	sion management requ		
controls	the core components of any web-based application or statefu s and maintains the state for a user or device interacting with as protocol to stateful, which is critical for differentiating differ	it. Session management		Description

Identification

Requireme

nt

### **Security By Design**

• Products are built in a way that reasonably protects against malicious cyber actors successfully gaining access to devices, data, and connected infrastructure


- Some core principles (from CISA):
  - Take Ownership of Customer Security Outcomes
  - Embrace Radical Transparency and Accountability
  - Build Organizational Structure and Leadership to Support Security Goals
- Some methods:
  - Document Conformance to Secure SDLC Frameworks
  - Implement Vulnerability Management
  - Utilize Open Source Software Responsibly
  - Provide Secure Defaults for Developers
  - Foster a Security-Conscious Developer Workforce

#### João Paulo Barraca, André Zúquete

## Design

### **Threat Modelling**


- To model and analyse technology systems and services to better understand how that system or service might be attacked or otherwise fail.
  - Identify boundaries to sub-domains
  - Identify Interactions
  - Identify potential locations for controls
- Steps:
  - Identify Assets and their relations (Scope)
  - Identify Attacks/Vulnerabilities/What could go wrong
  - Identify counter measures and mitigations
  - Evaluate



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### **Threat Modelling**

- STRIDE model facilitates finding security threats
  - Spoofing: Pretending to be something or someone other than yourself
  - Tampering: Modifying something on disk, network, memory, or elsewhere
  - **Repudiation**: Claiming that you didn't do something or were not responsible;
  - Information disclosure: Someone obtaining information they are not authorized to access
  - Denial of service: Exhausting resources needed to provide service
  - Elevation of privilege: Allowing someone to do something they are not authorized to do
- Potential damage of a threat is analyzed using an Attack Tree
  - Explores the possible chain of actions exploring threats
  - System Designers can build mitigations
  - Mitigation prevent further exploration along the attack tree



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
### **Threat Modelling**


A startup ecosystem based on mobile applications and APIs that manage peer to peer car rentals.

A customer can use a mobile app to unlock and start the car. The owner of the car has its own mobile app to manage rentals.

It has AI linked to its APIs and supports augmented reality features.


The APIs also allows to change radio stations which are stored in the cloud on a flat file for legacy reasons.





• Development is made through Versioned systems (e.g. GIT)

- With strong Access Control in place and Signed Commits
  - Prevent injection of malicious code by a third party
- Artifacts are extracted from Repository and built automatically
  - Commit hashes can be used to replicate the build process, detecting anomalies
- Allows facilitated Code Review and Attribution
- As collaborative environments, repositories shall not have secrets
  - Passwords and API keys
  - Custom configurations from each developer



João Paulo Darraca, Anare Zaquere


https://github.com/home-assistant/core/commit/a74247be934855f0d6a78e76adc722de9ffd4f34

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### **Dependency Management**

- Constitutes a major issue for a secure SDLC
  - Compromising a dependency is a proven method to subvert software
- Dependencies are easily injected
  - Each bringing both value and risk
  - Frameworks can rapidly inject Tens of libraries
- Dependency tracking and verification is vital
  - Includes applying tests and following the dependency development
  - Software and systems, while not dependencies should also be analyzed
  - Open Source model is especially vulnerable as dependencies are developed by small number of developers

"Further, 94% of projects had fewer than ten developers accounting for more than 90% of the LOC added. These findings are counter to the typically held belief that thousands or millions of developers are responsible for developing and maintaining FOSS projects. At a higher level, it was found that **136** developers were responsible for more than 80% of the LOC added to these 50 FOSS projects", Census II of Free and Open Source Software,



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### **Attacks to dependencies**

• **Typo squatting**: Deploys dependencies with names similar to original packages

Dependency confusion: Deploys dependencies with same names as private dependencies

• **Dependency takeover**: Getting ownership of dependency and/or its domain

• **Dependency compromise**: Compromising dependency library or software

SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK Attackers insert malicious code into a DLL component of legitimate software. The compromised DLL is distributed to organizations that use the related software.

#### EXECUTION, PERSISTENCE

When the software starts, the compromised DLL loads, and the inserted malicious code calls the function that contains the backdoor capabilities.

#### DEFENSE EVASION

The backdoor has a lengthy list of checks to make sure it's running in an actual compromised network.

#### RECON

The backdoor gathers system info

#### INITIAL C2


The backdoor connects to a command-and-control server. The domain it connects to is partly based on info gathered from system, making each subdomain unique. The backdoor may receive an additional C2 address to connect to.

#### **EXFILTRATION**


The backdoor sends gathered information to the attacker.

#### HANDS-ON-KEYBOARD ATTACK

The backdoor runs commands it receives from attackers. The wide range of backdoor capabilities allow attackers to perform additional activities, such as credential theft, progressive privilege escalation, and lateral movement.



### **XZ Supply Chain Attack**



### **The Polyfill attack**

- On June 25, 2024, the <u>Sansec forensics team</u> published a report revealing a supply chain attack targeting the widely-used Polyfill.io JavaScript library. The attack originated in February 2024 when Funnull, a Chinese company, acquired the previously legitimate Polyfill.io domain and GitHub account. Shortly thereafter, the service began redirecting users to malicious sites and deploying sophisticated malware with advanced evasion techniques.
- On June 27, 2024, Namecheap suspended the malicious polyfill.io domain, mitigating the immediate threat for now. However, Censys still detects <u>384,773 hosts</u> embedding a polyfill JS script linking to the malicious domain as of July 2,2024, primarily located in Germany.
  - These hosts include websites associated with major platforms like Hulu, Mercedes-Benz, and WarnerBros. Security experts strongly advise website owners to remove any references to polyfill.io and its associated domains from their codebase as a precautionary measure. Cloudflare and Fastly have offered alternative, secure endpoints for polyfill services as a workaround.
- Further investigation has uncovered a more extensive network of potentially compromised domains. Researchers identified four additional active domains linked to the same account that owned the polyfill.io domain. Censys detected 1,637,160 hosts referencing one or more of these endpoints. At least one of these domains has been observed engaging in malicious activities dating back to June 2023, but the nature of the other associated domains is currently unknown.

## Testing

### SAST

- Static application security testing
  - Analyses source code, identifying potential anti-patterns
  - Strongly linked with CWEs
  - Frequently included in CI/CD pipelines or IDEs
  - Typically, tools are language specific

### • Other uses:

- Dependency tracking
- Secret Detection

wp-admin/users.php Change this code to not construct SQL queries directly from user-controlled data. : 1 execution flow 1 SOURCE a user can craft an HTTP request with malicious content 2 A malicious value was previously assigned to this data structure 3 This invocation can propagate malicious content to its return value 4 This invocation can propagate malicious content to its return value 5 A malicious value can be assigned to variable '\$userids' 6 This invocation can propagate malicious content to its return value 7 This concatenation can propagate malicious content to the newly created string 8 SINK this invocation is not safe; a malicious value can be used as argument Navigate locations Alt + - wp-admin/users.php See all issues in this file \$errors = new WP\_Error( 'edit\_users', \_\_( 'Sorry, you are not allowed to delete users.' ) ); 207 ipbarr... 208 209 if ( empty(\$ REOUEST['users']) ) 210 \$userids = array( intval( \$\_REQUEST['user'] ) ); 211 else 212 5 \$userids = 4 array\_map( 'intval', 3 (array) 2 \$\_REQUEST['users'] ); 213 214 Susers have content = false: if ( 8 \$wpdb->get\_var( 7 "SELECT ID FROM {\$wpdb->posts} WHERE post\_author IN( ". 6 implode( ',', \$userids ). 215 ") LIMIT 1")) { Change this code to not construct SQL queries directly from user-controlled data. 216 \$users\_have\_content = true; 217 } elseif ( \$wpdb->get\_var( "SELECT link\_id FROM {\$wpdb->links} WHERE link\_owner IN( " . implode( ',', \$userids ) . ) LIMIT 1" ) ) { 218 \$users\_have\_content = true; 219 } 220 221 if ( \$users\_have\_content ) { 222 add\_action( 'admin\_head', 'delete\_users\_add\_js' ); 223 224 Show 183 more lines And inhare if / Lamatu/S CETE! wo http://ofocor/11/1/J

https://sonarcloud.io/project/issues?impactSeverities=HIGH&sonarsourceSecurity=sqlinjection&issueStatuses=OPEN%2CCONFIRMED&id=jpbarraca\_sqli-wordpress&open=AZJ7EX9Litd4gtZogF2B


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## Testing

### DAST

- Dynamic Application Security Testing
  - Analyses app behavior, identifying potential anomalies
  - Strongly linked with behavior analysis and error handling

- Involves active testing with application running
  - With test vectors for known typical vulnerabilities
    - XSS, XXE, SQLI...
  - With fuzzing: automated software testing technique that involves providing invalid, unexpected, or random data as inputs
  - Used to software in QA or production
  - Humans and AIs can enhance DAST conducting specialized attacks
    - Replicate Attack Chains or typical exploits



american fuz	zy lop ++4.21c {de	efault} (./serv	ver) [explore]
<pre> process timing</pre>	-,		— overall results —
	ays, 0 hrs, 0 min,	24 sec	cycles done : 0
last new find : 0 da			corpus count : 13
last saved crash : 0 da			saved crashes : 3
last saved hang : 0 da	ays, o nrs, o min,		saved hangs : <b>3</b>
— cycle progress —	(2.22)	- map coverage	
now processing : 0.0			y : 44.00% / 48.00%
runs timed out : 0 (	9.00%)		e : 27.33 bits/tuple
— stage progress ———		- findings in (	lepth
now trying : havoc		favored items	: 1 (7.69%)
stage execs : 2622/51	.2k (5.12%)	new edges on	: 2 (15.38%)
total execs : 2901			: 1332 (3 saved)
exec speed : 115.1/se	ec		: 573 (0 saved)
— fuzzing strategy yie	lds ———		- item geometry ———
bit flips : 0/128, 0	9/127, 0/125		levels : 2
byte flips : 0/16, 0,			pending : <b>13</b>
arithmetics : 0/1106,			pend fav : 1
known ints : 0/141, 0			own finds : 12
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0			imported : 0
havoc/splice : 0/0, 0/0			stability : <b>100.00%</b>
py/custom/rq : unused,		inused –	F
trim/eff : n/a, 93			[cpu000: 6
bacad fuzzing	state: st	tarted :-) —	

• AFL++

Testing

DAST

- Coverage-based fuzzing
  - Keeps track of what areas of the binary are executing or coverage •
  - Applies variation with a genetic algorithm
- Enables figuring out which inputs lead to which parts of the code executing

6%

### **Production**

• Production considers providing the service from a client facing environment

- May be internet facing
- May consider systems outside organization (e.g. public clouds)
- Constitutes a product, whose actions have relevant impact
- Defects may result in a CVE



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## **Production**

### **Relevant security mechanisms**

- Inventory and asset tracking
  - Enumerate and track assets relevant for service provisioning
  - Includes OS version, update level, support contracts, location and ownership

### Configuration hardening

- Impose a set of configuration guidelines to increase the security
  - Use of passwords vs keys, user permissions, installed packages....
- Hardening should follow internal policies plus best practices
  - CIS Benchmarks / CIS Controls Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)
  - NIST SP 800-53
  - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

## **Production**

### **Relevant security mechanisms**

- Configuration assessment against expected policies
  - OVAL Open Vulnerability And Assessment Language
  - XCCDF eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
- Artifact Integrity validation
  - Software signing of binaries produced
  - Validation of artifacts to specific source code repository releases
  - Reverse Engineer to check for additional injects
  - Common Criteria Assessment

### Maintenance

- Process of changing, modifying, and updating software to keep up with customer needs
- Includes
  - Monitoring exposition to internet
  - Deployment of observability capabilities to analyze operation
  - Monitoring features, use cases and abuse cases
  - Product support
  - Incident Response of issues found
- At this stage, issues can result in **security defects**
- Security Issues may have legal and brand impact



### Maintenance

- Defects are handled according to a risk based approach
  - E.g. CVSS Based considering Temporal and Environmental factors
  - Scoring allows defining a Service Level Agreement for defects to be handled

	Internal Assets	Interface Assets	External Facing Assets	
Emergency	30	10	10	
Critical	60	30	10	
High	120	60	30	
Medium	240	120	60	
Low	Not Considered			