

Smartcards



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
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Smartcard: Definition


▷ Card with computing processing capabilities

- ♦ CPU
- ♦ ROM
- ♦ EEPROM
- ♦ RAM



▷ Interface

- ♦ With contact
- ♦ Contactless




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Smartcard: Components



▷ CPU

- 8/16 bit
- Crypto-coprocessor (opt.)

▷ ROM

- Operating system
- Communication
- Cryptographic algorithms

▷ EEPROM

- File system
 - Programs / applications
 - Keys / passwords

▷ RAM

- Transient data
 - Erased on power off

▷ Mechanical contacts

- ISO 7816-2
 - Power
 - Soft reset
 - Clock
 - Half duplex I/O

▷ Physical security

- Tamperproof case
- Resistance to side-channel attacks




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Smartcard applications: Communication protocol stack



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T=0 and T=1

▷ T=0

- ♦ Each byte transmitted separately
- ♦ Slower

▷ T=1


- ♦ Blocks of bytes transmitted
- ♦ Faster

▷ ATR (ISO 7816-3)

- ♦ Response of the card to a reset operation
- ♦ Reports the protocol expected by the card



APDU (ISO 7816-4)



▷ Command APDU

- ♦ CLA (1 byte)
 - Class of the instruction
- ♦ INS (1 byte)
 - Command
- ♦ P1 and P2 (2 bytes)
 - Command-specific parameters
- ♦ Lc
 - Length of the optional command data
- ♦ Le
 - Length of data expected in subsequent Response APDU
 - Zero (0) means all data available

▷ Response APDU

- ♦ SW1 and SW2 (2 bytes)
 - Status bytes
 - 0x9000 means SUCCESS




Encoding objects in smartcards: TLV and ASN.1 BER

- ▷ Tag-Length-Value (TLV)
 - ♦ Object description with a tag value, the length of its contents and the contents
 - ♦ Each element of TLV is encoded according with ASN.1 BER
- ▷ Values can contain other TLV objects
 - ♦ The structure can be recursive



Smartcard: File system (1/3)

- ▷ File identification
 - ♦ Name or number
- ▷ File types
 - ♦ Master File (MF)
 - File system root, ID 0x3F00
 - ♦ Dedicated File (DF)
 - Similar to a directory
 - Can contain other EFs or DF
 - ♦ Elementary File (EF)
 - Ordinary data file
 - File size fixed and determined when created




Smartcard: File system (2/3)

▷ File system types


♦ Transparent

- Data blocks identified by offset + length



♦ Fixed records

- Indexed records




♦ Variable records

- Indexed records



♦ Cyclic

- Read pointer, write pointer
- Cyclic increments



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Smartcard: File system (3/3)

▷ Access control

♦ No restrictions

♦ Protected

- The file access APDU must contain a MAC computed with a key shared between the card and the off-card application

♦ External authentication

- The file access APDU is only allowed if the card already checked the existence of a common shared key with the off-card application
- Previous login




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Java cards

- ▷ Smartcards that run Java Applets
 - ♦ That use the JCRE
 - ♦ The JCRE runs on top of a native OS
- ▷ JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment)
 - ♦ Java Virtual Machine
 - ♦ Card Executive
 - Card management
 - Communications
 - ♦ Java Card Framework
 - Library functions




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Smartcard: Cryptographic protocols (1/6)

- ▷ External authentication
 - ♦ The smartcard authenticates the off-card application
 - ♦ Challenge-response protocol with random number
 - Initiated by the off-card application



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
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Smartcard:

Cryptographic protocols (2/6)

▷ Internal authentication

- ♦ The off-card application authenticates the smartcard
- ♦ Challenge-response protocol with random number and key number
 - Initiated by the off-card application



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Smartcard:

Cryptographic protocols (3/6)

▷ Secure messaging

- ♦ Protect data read from the smartcard
- ♦ Protect data written into the smartcard
- ♦ Protection forms
 - Authentication with MAC
 - Authentication with MAC and data encryption



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
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
Smartcard:

Cryptographic protocols (4/6)

▷ Authenticated readings




▷ Authenticated writings




Smartcard:

Cryptographic protocols (5/6)

▷ Authenticated and confidential readings




▷ Authenticated and confidential writings




Smartcard:

Cryptographic protocols (6/6)

▷ Session key derivation



▷ Session key uploading



OpenCard Framework (OCF)

▷ Goal: facilitate the development of smartcard-based solutions

- Make the parts of the solution, typically provided by different parties, independent of each other
- <https://www.openscdp.org/ocf>

▷ Parties:

- Card issuer
 - Card initialization, personalization and issuing
- Card OS provider
 - Basic, lowest level card behavior
- Card reader / terminal provider
 - Interfaces that deal with reading from and writing into cards
- Application / service provider
 - Development of off-card (and possibly on-card) applications



Cryptographic services

- ▷ Ciphers
- ▷ Digest functions
- ▷ Key generation
- ▷ Key management
 - ♦ Key import
 - ♦ Key export
- ▷ Digital signatures
 - ♦ Generation
 - ♦ Verification
- ▷ Management of public key certificates
 - ♦ Generation
 - ♦ Verification




Cryptographic services: Middleware

- ▷ Libraries that bridge the gap between functionalities of smartcards and high-level applications
- ▷ Some standard approaches:
 - ♦ PKCS #11
 - Cryptographic Token Interface Standard (Cryptoki)
 - Defined by RSA Security Inc.
 - ♦ PKCS #15
 - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard
 - Defined by RSA Security Inc.
 - ♦ CAPI CSP
 - CryptoAPI Cryptographic Service Provider
 - Defined by Microsoft for Windows systems
 - ♦ PC/SC
 - Personal computer/smartcard
 - Standard framework for smartcard access on Windows systems



PKCS #11:

Cryptoki middleware integration




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PKCS #11:

Cryptoki object hierarchy



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PKCS #11: Cryptoki sessions

- ▷ Logical connections between applications and tokens
 - ♦ R/O and R/W sessions
 - ♦ Session owners
 - Public
 - User
 - Security Officer (SO)
- ▷ Session objects
 - ♦ Transient objects created during sessions
- ▷ Lifetime of sessions
 - ♦ Usually for a single operation on the token
- ▷ Operations on open sessions
 - ♦ Administrative
 - Login/logout
 - ♦ Object management
 - Create / destroy an object on the token
 - ♦ Cryptographic




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PKCS #11: Cryptoki R/O sessions login/logout



- ▷ R/O public session
 - ♦ Read-only access to public token objects
 - ♦ Read/write access to public session objects
- ▷ R/O user functions
 - ♦ Read-only access to all token objects (public or private)
 - ♦ Read/write access to all session objects (public or private)




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PKCS #11:

Cryptoki R/W sessions login/logout



▷ R/W public session

- Read/write access to all public objects

▷ R/W SO functions

- Read/write access only to public objects on the token
 - Not to private objects
- The SO can set the normal user's PIN

▷ R/W user functions

- Read/write access to all objects




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Cartão de Cidadão: Middleware for Unix (Linux/MacOS)




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Cartão de Cidadão: Middleware for Windows



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