


Java Virtual Machine Security



Java 2 Security Model



▶ Java Virtual Machine (JVM)

- ♦ Java programs are implemented by a set of Java classes
 - From different sources
 - Not necessarily trusted
- ♦ Secure sandbox for executing Java programs

▶ Security capabilities

- ♦ Easily configurable security policy
- ♦ Easily extensible access control structure
- ♦ Extension of security checks to all Java programs




JVM sandbox model

- ▷ Creates a barrier around a Java execution environment
 - Applications are executed within a sandbox bounds
 - Cannot affect resources outside the sandbox
 - i.e. can only access resources available to the sandbox
- ▷ Basic rules of sandbox
 - Remote resource protection
 - Enforced by remote system
 - Local resource protection
 - Enforced by local security manager
 - JVM code and data protection
 - Enforced by static and dynamic checking



Java byte code



- ▷ One cannot assume that byte codes are produced by a correct compiler!
 - Byte codes can be produced by malware
- ▷ The JVM must tackle wrong or malicious byte codes




Java Run-time Environment (JRE): Security-related features

- ▷ Loads required classes
 - Usually upon a class method invocation
- ▷ Verifies the correctness of loaded classes
 - Checks consistency and integrity
- ▷ Compiles bytecodes
 - Only for invoked methods
 - Just-in-time
 - Keeps original bytecodes
 - For enforcing run-time validations
- ▷ Correct memory management
 - Memory allocation when needed
 - Automatic garbage collection
- ▷ Checks the correct execution of classes' code
 - Run-time integrity validations
 - Null pointer (ref)
 - Type checking
 - Dynamic (down)casting
 - Array bounds, etc.
 - Run-time security validations
 - Access control
 - Public, Package, Protected and Private access levels
 - Other permissions for Protection Domains
- ▷ Confinement
 - Isolation of Protection Domains



Protection domain



- ▷ A set of classes whose instances are granted the same set of permissions
 - Determined by the policy currently in effect
- ▷ JRE maintains a mapping from code (classes and instances) to their protection domains
- ▷ Instantiation of Protection Domains
 - `ProtectionDomain (CodeSource, PermissionCollection);`
 - `ProtectionDomain (CodeSource, PermissionCollection, ClassLoader, Principal[]);`
 - `CodeSource (URL, Certificate[]);`



Permissions

▷ Definitions of what is allowed or denied

- ♦ Subclasses of interface `java.security.Permission`

▷ Examples

- ♦ `BasicPermission`
 - Hierarchical name and arbitrary (or boolean) action
 - `RuntimePermission`, `AWTPermission`, `ManagementPermission`, `NetPermission`, `PropertyPermission`, etc.
- ♦ `FilePermission`
 - Pathname & action (read, write, execute, delete)
- ♦ `SocketPermission`
 - Host + port + action (accept, connect, listen, resolve)



Security policies

▷ Each JRE maintains an installed security policy

- ♦ It determines the set of granted/denied authorizations
- ♦ Subclass of `java.security.policy`

▷ Installed policy

- ♦ There is always a policy installed (`Policy Policy.getPolicy()`)
 - JRE includes a default policy reference implementation
 - Policy specified within one or more configuration files
 - `{java_home}/lib/security/default.policy`
 - Can be referenced by caller with `getPolicy` permission
- ♦ Can be overwritten (`void Policy.setPolicy(Policy)`)
 - Requires a `setPolicy` permission
 - The source location for the policy information utilized by the Policy object is up to the Policy implementation



Security manager

- ▷ At most one per JVM
 - ♦ Enforces a security policy for an application
 - What is allowed and denied
 - ♦ It helps to check whether an action is allowed before requesting it
 - In the context of the calling thread
- ▷ Class `SecurityManager` of `java.lang`
 - ♦ Default run-time security manager
 - ♦ Can be redefined
 - but requires runtime permission `setSecurityManager`
 - This prevents malicious classes to overrun an installed security manager
 - ♦ Many `checkXXX` methods
 - For checking authorization for specific actions
`void checkRead(String file)`
 - Uses the `AccessController` class and the method `checkPermissions`



AccessController

- ▷ An abstract class used for:
 - ♦ Decide whether an access to a critical system resource is to be allowed or denied
 - According to the security policy currently in effect
`FilePermission p = new FilePermission("/temp/testFile", "read");`
`AccessController.checkPermission(p);`
 - ♦ Mark code as being *privileged*
 - Affecting subsequent access determinations
 - ♦ Obtaining a *snapshot* of the current calling context so access-control decisions from a different context can be made with respect to the saved context



Dynamic class loading: Class loaders

- ▷ **Primordial class loader**
 - ♦ Critical part of VM
 - Trusted VM component, defined in JVM specification
 - ♦ Prevents name spoofing of **java.*** library classes
- ▷ **Additional class loaders**
 - ♦ Defined by users/applications
 - They can help application to locate and download classes' contents
 - But the bytecodes of classes are installed by the VM class loader
 - ♦ Each one defines separate namespace environment
 - Each class is tagged with class loader that loaded it
 - Classes in one namespace cannot interact with classes in other namespaces
 - ♦ Allows different versions of same class name to co-exist
 - Typically associated with code from different origins



Dynamic class loading: Overview (1/2)

- ▷ **Class loading security policies**
 - ♦ No class loading of packages **java.*** other than from the canonical local repository
 - To avoid the replacement of the basic Java classes
 - Primordial class loader ensures this
 - ♦ Classes from different network servers do not interact
 - Different domains
 - No interference between "programs" of different sources



Dynamic class loading: Overview (2/2)

▷ Class loading steps

- ♦ Locate the requested binary class
 - .class file
- ♦ Parse/translate into internal data structures for emulation
- ♦ Enforce the naming conventions
 - Domain, package, classes, fields/methods
 - Accessibility levels: public, private, package
- ♦ Check correctness of binary class
 - File integrity check
 - Class integrity check
 - Bytecode integrity check
 - Runtime integrity check
- ♦ Perform any translation of code and metadata
 - Make the method ready to be run
- ♦ Initialize memory and pass control to emulation engine



Dynamic class loading: Class loader checks

▷ File integrity check

- ♦ Magic number, proper formats used
- ♦ Component declared and actual sizes

▷ Class integrity check

- ♦ Has superclass and is not final
- ♦ No override of final superclass method
- ♦ Methods and fields have legal names and signatures

▷ Bytecode integrity check

- ♦ Data-flow analysis
- ♦ Stack checking
- ♦ Static type checking for method arguments and bytecode operands

▷ Runtime integrity checks

- ♦ Verifications on method calls



Subjects, Principals and Credentials

- ▷ Subjects (`javax.security.auth.Subject`) aggregate info related with a single (authenticated) entity
 - ♦ Identities
 - ♦ Credentials (public and private)
- ▷ Principals (`java.security.Principal`) encapsulate identities
 - ♦ Bind names to Subjects
- ▷ Credentials can be any kind of object

