

EAP for Secure Hotspots (EAP-SH)

An EAP authentication protocol to integrate Captive Portals with 802.11i

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Wi-Fi Security: 802.11i

- ▷ Defines most Wi-Fi security mechanisms
 - ♦ Network access authentications
 - ♦ Payload confidentiality
 - ♦ Data frame integrity control
 - 802.11w deals with management frames
- ▷ It provides link-layer security
 - ♦ Cannot be replaced by security mechanisms provided at different layers



Captive Portals

- ▷ Widely used in hotspots in several scenarios
 - ♦ Hotels, airports, etc.
- ▷ They handle hotspots' network access control
 - ♦ Clients' enrolment and authentication
- ▷ Require a web-based Man-in-the-Middle hack
 - ♦ New clients are redirected to an HTTP Portal
 - ♦ The Portal enrolls / authenticates clients
 - ♦ Authorized clients stop being redirected



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Captive Portals: why?

- ▷ Zero configuration
 - ♦ Clients do not need to configure anything
 - There are pushed to Captive Portals when needed
 - Browsers maintain session cookies
 - ♦ But similar schemes could exist on operating systems for 802.11i
 - They already exist to handle Captive Portals
- ▷ Account management
 - ♦ Allow the enrolment of people
 - ♦ Not possible with 802.11i !!



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Captive Portals' security problems

- ▷ Do not produce key material for 802.11i/w
 - ♦ No link layer protection
 - ♦ Frames' payloads are exposed
 - ♦ Frame injection is possible
- ▷ Sessions can be easily hijacked
- ▷ Networks can be abused using tunnels

- ▷ WPA3 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 3)
 - ♦ Does not tackle this issue



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Proposed alternative

- ▷ Keep the Captive Portal benefit
 - ♦ Enrolment of new users with a web service
- ▷ Explore existing Wi-Fi security mechanisms
 - ♦ 802.11i/w
- ▷ This means dealing at the 802.1X level
 - ♦ The 802.11i network authentication framework



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EAP-SH: EAP for Secure Hotspots

- ▷ The 802.1X is an extensible framework
 - ♦ Uses EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
 - ♦ There are many different EAP protocols
- ▷ EAP-SH is just another EAP protocol
 - ♦ One that allows clients to deal with Captive Portals
 - ♦ No other allows that



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EAP-SH overview

- ▷ It combines two authentication types
 - ♦ Arbitrary authentication with a web Captive Portal
 - For getting session credentials
 - ♦ EAP-TLS authentication
 - With asymmetric key pairs and X.509 certificates
 - Certificates can contain session time limits
- ▷ HTTP tunneling
 - ♦ Interactions w/ Captive Portals are tunneled by EAP-SH
 - ♦ No prior network configuration is required to do that



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EAP-SH protocol phases

▷ 1st phase

♦ The client has access credentials

- Private key and X.509 certificate
- It uses them as in EAP-TLS

♦ Otherwise

- Creates a TLS tunnel over EAP
- Jumps to 2nd phase

▷ 2nd phase

♦ Login in the Captive Portal

- With a browser
- User participation

♦ Request of X.509 certificate

- Transparently to users


♦ Repeat 1st phase



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EAP-SH architecture and interactions



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Public key certificates

- ▷ The only trust anchor is the AS certificate
 - ♦ Which is a normal requirement
- ▷ Captive Portals do not require a certificate
 - ♦ Browsers do not interact directly with them
- ▷ Captive Portals' logins do not require HTTPS protection
 - ♦ Since HTTP traffic is tunneled over TLS and EAP
- ▷ User certificates
 - ♦ Can be generated by a Hotspot private CA
 - ♦ Only the AS needs to validate them
 - ♦ Can establish sessions' time bounds



EAP-SH privacy

- ▷ EAP-TLS exposes identities in clients' certificates
 - ♦ But client's certificates can have pseudonyms
- ▷ Clients request certificates for the identity they get upon a Captive Portal login
 - ♦ The Hotspot can use pseudonyms
 - ♦ Pseudonyms can change upon each login



EAP-SH security and usability

- ▷ Extends 802.11X and generates keys for 802.11i/w
 - ♦ Thus enable link security
- ▷ Permanent AS certificate configuration
 - ♦ No need to check for HTTPS protection
 - ♦ There are many ways to securely configure it
- ▷ Client software can customize Captive Portals' interfaces
 - ♦ To avoid phishing attacks with rogue servers
- ▷ Browsers cannot remember users' credentials
 - ♦ As they interact directly with the Supplicant's application



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EAP-SH performance

- ▷ With existing asymmetric credentials
 - ♦ Same as an EAP-TLS authentication
- ▷ Without those credentials
 - ♦ Login with user interaction
 - ♦ CSR generation and upload
 - ♦ Certificate generation and download
 - ♦ EAP-TLS authentication



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Conclusion

- ▷ EAP-SH integrates Captive Portals with 802.11i
 - ♦ Enabling the subsequent link security
- ▷ Sessions can be maintained with user certificates
 - ♦ Generated on a need basis upon a Captive Portal login
- ▷ Supplicants and Authentication Servers need an update
 - ♦ But not APs!



Publications

- ▷ Marques, N., Zúquete, A., & Barraca, J. P. (2020). EAP-SH: An EAP Authentication Protocol to Integrate Captive Portals in the 802.1 X Security Architecture. *Wireless Personal Communications*, 1-25.
- ▷ Marques, N., Zúquete, A., & Barraca, J. P. (2019). Integration of the Captive Portal paradigm with the 802.1 X architecture. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.09927*.

