

# Digital signatures



## Digital signatures: goals

- ▷ Authenticate the contents of a document
  - ♦ Ensure its integrity
- ▷ Authenticate its author
  - ♦ Ensure the identity of the creator/originator
- ▷ Non-repudiation
  - ♦ Prevent signing repudiation



## Digital signatures: fundamental approach

### ▷ Signature generation

- ♦ Production of a value using a private key
- ♦ Signer (or signatory) is the private key owner

### ▷ Signature verification

- ♦ Validation of an expression using the signature and a public key
- ♦ Anyone can verify
  - Since public keys can be universally known
- ♦ Signature can be linked to the public key owner



## Signature schemes

### ▷ With message (or document) recovery

- ♦ The message is fully recovered upon a signature validation
- ♦ Signature validation is mandatory prior to message observation

### ▷ With appendix

- ♦ The signature is detached from the message
- ♦ The message can be observed anytime



## Key elements of a digital signature

- ▷ The message (or document)
  - ♦ It only makes sense with the signed object
- ▷ The signature date
  - ♦ Because is usually required
  - ♦ Because key pairs have validity periods
- ▷ The identity of the signatory
  - ♦ Otherwise, it would not mean anything



## The document to sign

- ▷ It may accommodate digital signatures as appendixes
  - ♦ PDF, XML
  - ♦ DOCX (archive of XML components)
- ▷ Other formats may group document and signature
  - ♦ S/MIME (mail)
  - ♦ JOSE (JSON Object Signing and Encryption)



## The signature date

- ▷ It may be given by the signatory machine
  - ♦ Does not protect against time forgery attacks by the signatory
- ▷ It may be given by a Time Stamping Authority (TSA)
  - ♦ Does not protect against the future discovery of the private keys used



## The identity of the signatory

- ▷ Usually provided by a X.509 public key certificate
  - ♦ It provides several attributes of the identity
  - ♦ It provides the public key for signature validation
  - ♦ It provides the acceptable signing time frame
    - Together with the respective CRL



## Optional elements of a digital signature

### ▷ Attributes that can help to interpret it

#### ♦ Location

- Where it was signed

#### ♦ Reason

- Why it was signed

#### ♦ Appearance

- Handwritten signature (usually without legal value)
- Name of the signatory
- Date of signature
- Some kind of logo



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## Digital signatures' algorithms

### ▷ Message recovery scheme

- ♦ Asymmetric encryption and decryption
- ♦ Only for RSA

#### ▷ Signing

$$A_x(\text{doc}) = \text{info} + E(K_x^{-1}, \text{doc})$$

#### ▷ Verification

$$\text{info} \rightarrow K_x$$

$$D(K_x, A_x(\text{doc}))$$

Check integrity of doc

### ▷ Message appendix scheme

- ♦ Digest functions
- ♦ Asymmetric signature and validation
- ♦ RSA, ElGamal (DSA), EC

#### ▷ Signing

$$A_x(\text{doc}) = \text{info} + E(K_x^{-1}, h(\text{doc} + \text{info}))$$

$$A_x(\text{doc}) = \text{info} + S(K_x^{-1}, h(\text{doc} + \text{info}))$$

#### ▷ Verification

$$\text{info} \rightarrow K_x$$

$$D(K_x, A_x(\text{doc})) \equiv h(\text{doc} + \text{info})$$

$$V(K_x, A_x(\text{doc}), h(\text{doc} + \text{info})) = \text{True}$$



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# RSA signatures

- ▷ Creation with private key
  - ♦ Validation with the corresponding public key
- ▷ Special padding for Signature Scheme w/ Appendix
  - ♦ RSASSA-PKCS#1 (v1.5)
    - Deterministic
  - ♦ RSASSA-PSS (Probabilistic Signature Scheme)
    - Randomized (EMSA-PSS)
- ▷ Hash function prefixing
  - ♦ ASN.1 algorithm OID




# ASN.1 digest algorithm prefixes

Digest	ASN.1 OID	Prefix (bytes)
MD5	1.2.840.113549.2.5	30 20 30 0C 06 08 <b>2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 02 05</b> 05 00 04 10
RIPEMD-160	1.3.36.3.2.1	30 21 30 09 06 05 <b>2B 24 03 02 01</b> 05 00 04 14
SHA-1	1.3.14.3.2.26	30 21 30 09 06 05 <b>2B 0E 03 02 1A</b> 05 00 04 14
SHA-224	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4	30 2D 30 0D 06 09 <b>60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 04</b> 05 00 04 1C
SHA-256	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1	30 31 30 0D 06 09 <b>60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01</b> 05 00 04 20
SHA-384	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2	30 41 30 0D 06 09 <b>60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02</b> 05 00 04 30
SHA-512	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3	30 51 30 0D 06 09 <b>60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03</b> 05 00 04 40



# Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

- ▷ With a variant of ElGamal
  - Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
  - Uses a random value  $X$ , and its multiplicative inverse,  $X^{-1}$
  - $r$  depends on  $X$ ,  $s$  depends on  $X^{-1}$
- ▷ With elliptic curves (ECDSA)
  - Similar to DSA with EC



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# Blind signatures

- ▷ Signatures made by a “blinded” signer
  - Signer cannot observe the contents it signs
  - Similar to a handwritten signature on an envelope containing a document and a carbon-copy sheet
- ▷ Useful for ensuring anonymity of the signed information holder, while the signed information provides some extra functionality
  - Signer  $X$  knows who requires a signature ( $Y$ )
  - $X$  signs  $T_1$ , but  $Y$  afterwards transforms it into a signature over  $T_2$ 
    - Not any  $T_2$ , a specific one linked to  $T_1$
  - Requester  $Y$  can present  $T_2$  signed by  $X$ 
    - But it cannot change  $T_2$
    - $X$  cannot link  $T_2$  to the  $T_1$  that it observed when signing



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## Chaum Blind Signatures

### ▷ Implementation using RSA

#### ♦ Blinding

- Random blinding factor  $K$

- $k \times k^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$

- $m' = k^e \times m \pmod{N}$

#### ♦ Ordinary signature (encryption w/ private key)

- $A_x(m') = (m')^d \pmod{N}$

#### ♦ Unblinding

- $A_x(m) = k^{-1} \times A_x(m') \pmod{N}$



## Qualified electronic signature

### ▷ An electronic signature compliant with the EU eIDAS Regulation

#### ♦ Regulation No 910/2014

### ▷ Enables to verify the authorship of a declaration in electronic data exchange

#### ♦ Over long periods of time

### ▷ Can be considered as a digital equivalent to handwritten signatures





## Qualified electronic signature

### ▷ Three main requirements:

- ♦ The signatory must be linked and uniquely identified to the signature
- ♦ The data used to create the signature must be under the sole control of the signatory
- ♦ Must have the ability to identify if the data that accompanies the signature has been tampered with since the signing of the message



## Qualified electronic signature

### ▷ Must be created using a qualified signature creation device

- ♦ This device uses specific hardware and software that ensures that the signatory only has control of their private key

### ▷ A qualified trust service provider manages the signature creation data that is produced

- ♦ But the signature creation data must remain unique, confidential and protected from forgery



## Signature devices

### ▷ Crypto tokens

- ♦ Smartcards
- ♦ Cartão de Cidadão

### ▷ Cloud HSM (Hardware Secure Modules)

- ♦ Mainly for mobile devices
- ♦ Chave Móvel Digital



## PKCS #11

### ▷ Crypto tokens' standard interface

- ♦ Cryptoki

### ▷ Enables applications to use arbitrary PKCS #11 libraries

- ♦ Developed for a specific set of crypto tokens

### ▷ Specification in C

- ♦ There are interfaces for other languages



## Microsoft Cryptographic API (CAPI)

- ▷ Unique OS security middleware hub
  - ♦ Applications use the abstractions it provides
- ▷ Cryptographic Services Providers (CSP)
  - ♦ Target-specific software module under the CAPI
    - It enables a particular functionality
  - ♦ Signature capabilities can be added with CSPs
    - For local crypto tokens
    - For remote, cloud-based HSMs



## Long-Term Validation (LTV)

- ▷ A document signature may become invalid upon an initial verification
  - ♦ Due to a late certification revocation
- ▷ Signature algorithms may become vulnerable
  - ♦ Allowing signatures with old credentials to be forged
- ▷ LTV attempts to handle both issues
  - ♦ With successive signature layers
  - ♦ Performed by original signers or signed documents' holders
  - ♦ It leverages signed timestamps created by TSAs
    - Proof of Existence (POE)



## LTV: Proof of Existence (POE)

A proof of existence is evidence that proves that an object (a **certificate**, a **CRL**, **signature value**, **hash value**, etc.) existed at a specific date/time, which may be a date/time in the past.

The possession of a certain object at current time is a proof of its existence at the current time.

A suitable way of providing proof of existence of an object at a time in the past is to generate a time-stamp on that object.

Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI): Signature validation procedures and policies, ETSI TS 102 853 V1.1.2 (2012-10)

- ▷ If
  - a signed timestamp can be validated **now**
  - and
  - the timestamp is bounded to values that were valid **when** it was signed
  - then
  - those values are valid **now**



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## LTV Advanced Electronic Signatures (AdES)

- ▷ PAdES
  - ♦ PDF Advanced Electronic Signature
- ▷ CAdES
  - ♦ Cryptographic Message Syntax Advanced Electronic Signatures
- ▷ XAdES
  - ♦ XML Advanced Electronic Signatures



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